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AbstrAct
In a landmark judgment in the English Court of 
Protection, the judge (Charles J) found it to be in the 
best interests of a minimally conscious patient for 
clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) to 
be withdrawn, with the inevitable consequence that 
the patient would die. In making this judgment, it was 
accepted that the patient’s level of consciousness—if 
CANH were continued and rehabilitation provided—
might improve, and that he might become capable of 
expressing emotions and making simple choices. The 
decision to withdraw treatment relied on a best interests 
decision, which gave great weight to the patient’s 
past wishes, feelings, values and beliefs, and brought a 
‘holistic’ approach to understanding what this particular 
patient would have wanted. We draw on our own 
experience of supporting families, advocating for patients 
and training healthcare professionals in similar situations 
to consider the implications of the published judgment 
for policy and practice with patients in prolonged 
disorders of consciousness and their families.
In 2016, a landmark and widely reported judgment 
in the English Court of Protection1 found it to be 
in the best interests of a minimally conscious*pa-
tient for clinically assisted nutrition and hydration 
(CANH) to be withdrawn, with the inevitable 
consequence that the patient would die. In this 
commentary, we consider the implications of the 
judgment for policy and practice with patients in 
prolonged disorders of consciousness† and their 
families. We are particularly concerned to address 
how the judgment can inform the legal conscious-
ness and moral reasoning of people who care for 
and about these patients in everyday practice.
The facts as recorded in the published judgment1 
are as follows: Paul Briggs (PB), a police officer, 
was knocked off his motorbike while travelling to 
work in July 2015. He was diagnosed as being in 
a minimally conscious state (MCS) at the point at 
which the case was heard and judgment handed 
*The ‘minimally conscious state’ (MCS) is defined as ‘a 
state of severely altered consciousness in which minimal 
but clearly discernible behavioural evidence of self- or en-
vironmental awareness is demonstrated. MCS is charac-
terised by inconsistent, but reproducible, responses above 
the level of spontaneous or reflexive behaviour, which in-
dicate that the patient has some degree of interaction with 
their surroundings’.2
†Prolonged disorders of consciousness include ‘coma’, the 
‘vegetative state’ and the ‘minimally conscious state’ (but 
not ‘locked-in syndrome’ or ‘brainstem death’). Full defi-
nitions can be found in the National Clinical Guidelines.2
down in December 2016. This was more than 16 
months after his traumatic brain injury, but well 
within the 5-year post-onset period during which 
it is clinically accepted that improvements in the 
level of consciousness can occur.2 Proceedings 
were brought by his wife, Lindsey Briggs, who 
believed that her husband would not want his life 
to be prolonged in his current—and likely future—
condition. She was opposed by the NHS Trust, the 
Clinical Commissioning Group responsible for 
providing medical treatment and the Official Solic-
itor (PB’s ‘litigation friend’), all of whom argued 
that it was in PB’s best interests to receive further 
assessment and treatment with the possibility 
that his degree of consciousness might improve, 
although with remaining profound physical and 
mental disabilities such that it was highly unlikely 
that he would ever be able to make his own serious 
medical treatment decisions.
best interests
Those unfamiliar with the English legal system 
for adults who lack capacity should note that, in 
accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
all parties were required to address the question of 
PB’s ‘best interests’ rather than seeking to apply the 
standard of ‘substituted judgment’, that is, what the 
patient might have decided for himself if he’d had 
capacity to do so (which is the standard applied in 
many other jurisdictions). ‘Best interests’ include 
consideration of the person’s past and present 
wishes and feelings, and their values, beliefs and 
any other factors they would consider as relevant 
to their decision if they were able to do so (s 4 (6) 
Mental Capacity Act 2005), but also puts weight 
on ‘all the relevant circumstances’ (s 4 (2) Mental 
Capacity Act 2005), which might—and, in prac-
tice, regularly do—include diagnosis, prognosis and 
‘sanctity of life’.
The relative weight to be given to a person’s 
own views in arriving at a ‘best interests’ decision 
and how to set those against ‘sanctity of life’ is not 
specified in the Act, but has developed through case 
law. Public understanding of the application of the 
law to minimally conscious patients (and the weight 
to be given to the person’s own views) is informed 
by an earlier (highly publicised) judgment, W v M 
& Ors [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam), in which, as in 
Briggs, family members were seeking authorisation 
for CANH withdrawal from a minimally conscious 
patient and were opposed by the Primary Care Trust 
and Official Solicitor. In that case, the presiding 
judge (Baker J) accepted the family’s reports about 
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the patient’s general views about matters such as life-prolonging 
treatments and institutional living, but took a narrow approach 
to interpreting her prior wishes, highlighting the fact that she 
had not specifically said that if she were in an MCS she would 
want CANH withdrawn.‡ He also said it would ‘be wrong to 
attach significant weight to those statements made prior to her 
collapse’ when setting them against ‘the importance of the sanc-
tity of life’. He ordered that treatment must be continued. In 
the aftermath of this judgment, there was a widespread belief 
among family members of minimally conscious patients that 
CANH withdrawal could not be authorised for patients so diag-
nosed, and this view was reinforced by some legal advisors and 
healthcare practitioners.3 4 The Briggs case is hugely significant, 
then, for its potential to reverse the effect of W v M and for the 
signal it sends to everyone involved that CANH may not be in 
the best interests of all MCS patients.§
the significAnce of briggs for everyDAy prActice
The Briggs case was described by the presiding judge as one that 
engages fundamental principles: ‘on the one side, the sanctity 
of life and so the very strong but not absolute presumption in 
favour of continuing Mr Briggs’ life and, on the other side, the 
principle of self-determination’ (para 8).1 Framing up the issue 
in this way makes Briggs (like Bland,5 the first UK case to autho-
rise withdrawal from a patient in a permanent vegetative state) 
a quintessential ‘stigmata’ case. It ‘enables the marks of a deeper 
system of values to be seen on the surface of a specific dispute’6 
and ‘provides a context in which the values of a society can be 
expressed and also a mechanism whereby clashes of competing 
values can be resolved’.7 The Briggs judgment raises and engages 
directly with ethical arguments accessible and relevant to the 
concerns often expressed by families and healthcare profes-
sionals (and indeed in public debate) about similar dilemmas in 
relation to other patients.
The Briggs judgment is significant in part for the great weight 
Charles J gave to the person’s own views, even when set against 
‘sanctity of life’: ‘if the decision that P would have made, and 
so their wishes on such an intensely personal issue can be 
ascertained with sufficient certainty it should generally prevail 
over the very strong presumption in favour of preserving life’ 
(para 62).1 This is in keeping with the ‘readily discernible’ trend 
other commentators have noted when examining the evolution 
of case law in the Court of Protection.8
The facts in Briggs, the priority given to ascertaining his wishes 
and the decision reached, are particularly significant given that 
large numbers of patients in disorders of consciousness¶ are 
‡The W v M case preceded the judgment in Aintree University Hospi-
tals NHS Trust v James [2014] AC 509, in which the Supreme Court 
confirmed that a much more holistic approach (as now exemplified in 
Briggs) is to be taken to understanding patients’ wishes.
§There are two earlier cases in which judges authorised withholding/
withdrawing of CANH from patients diagnosed as being in MCS, but 
the facts in these cases are significantly different in ways that favoured 
a decision against continuing treatment. In one the patient had been 
physically resistant to all efforts to provide her with nutrition and had 
pulled out a nasogastric tube and several cannula (United Lincolnshire 
Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] COPLR 60). In the other the patient 
had very advanced multiple sclerosis (Re N [2016] COPLR 88). In Briggs, 
by contrast, there were no practical impediments to continued CANH, 
and he did not have a terminal condition.
¶There is no central register of such patients, so accurate reports of their 
numbers are impossible to obtain—and doubtless many are undiagnosed 
or misdiagnosed—but estimates suggest that there may be between 4000 
and 16 000 permanent vegetative state (PVS) patients in the UK and up 
to three times that many in MCS.16
maintained in care homes for many years without any consider-
ation as to whether or not continuing CANH is what they would 
have wanted. Previous research shows this is so even when their 
families believe that the person would want to refuse treatment 
and have tried to communicate this fact to staff.9
‘Best interests’ decisions—including any effort to ascertain or 
factor in the patient’s own wishes—are often put ‘on hold’ until 
a certain level of diagnostic and prognostic certainty has been 
reached, during which time families are not asked about patients’ 
views about continuing CANH on the spurious grounds that 
CANH must be delivered until the prognosis is clearer. For some 
of these patients (those who emerge), there is then no treatment to 
withdraw (because swallowing has been established and CANH is 
no longer required) and the’ window of opportunity’ for allowing 
death by treatment withdrawal has passed.9
The key competing concepts of ‘sanctity of life’ and ‘self-de-
termination’ invoked and deployed in the Briggs case are deeply 
resonant for families and healthcare professionals. Conflicting 
personal commitments and contested claims about the legal and 
ethical status of these principles are mobilised in deciding the 
fate of the much larger number of patients whose cases never 
reach the court—in relation to CANH and also in relation 
to other life-prolonging treatment decisions concerning, for 
example, resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest or the provi-
sion of antibiotics for life-threatening infections. This makes the 
Briggs judgment very important for opening up discussion—and 
indeed invaluable, as a training tool—not only regarding the 
care of MCS patients, but also in relation to patients lacking 
capacity in a wide range of other conditions. We use the case to 
inform reflection in face-to-face training in care homes and are 
integrating it into an online e-learning resource.
In what follows we highlight the ways in which the Briggs 
judgment can be used to inform and engage families and profes-
sionals with respect to the two key principles invoked, and the 
balance between them.
‘sanctity of Life’
The concept of ‘sanctity of life’ has been extensively analysed 
by philosophers for whom it can seem ‘impossibly vague and 
misleading’,10 but the judicial use of the phrase in Briggs (on each 
of its 10 occasions of use) seems simply to refer to a strong (but 
not absolute) presumption in favour of preserving human life. 
For example: ‘The default position for such persons is founded 
on the sanctity of life and so the strong presumption that lives 
that have value should be continued by life-sustaining treatment 
(here CANH)’ (para 3).1
The term ‘sanctity of life’ is often understood as a religious 
concept, and we have found it rarely used in practice either by fami-
lies or by health practitioners except those speaking as members of a 
faith group. Nonetheless, people very commonly display a commit-
ment to a secular version of ‘sanctity of life’ (like that of the Briggs 
judgment) when they express the view that it would be wrong to 
‘cause’ death by withdrawing treatment. It can feel to both families 
and healthcare staff as though CANH withdrawal (in particular) is 
a form of ‘euthanasia’ and it is sometimes associated with ‘assisted 
dying’.11 Some believe it to be unethical or unlawful (even when 
they accept withdrawal or withholding of other life-prolonging 
treatments) because nutrition and hydration are seen as basic care. 
Some believe it violates professional ethics, the Hippocratic Oath, 
or the ‘duty of care’. The Briggs judgment is helpful in opening up 
debate around these issues because Charles J is clear that ‘this is not 
an assisted dying or euthanasia case’ (para 19).1 Nonetheless, for 
some professionals and families ‘sanctity of life’ considerations (and 
the enduring hope for future recovery, however unlikely or however 
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limited) will over-ride all other considerations—and, indeed, some 
patients may have held this position themselves when they had 
capacity to do so.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for family members to 
express the view that their relative ‘would rather be dead’, that they 
‘wish he had died’ or that they ‘hope she will be at peace’ soon.9 
Health professionals tend to react with alarm to such statements, 
not wanting to be implicated in ‘causing’ death and sometimes 
aware that, in law, a ‘desire to bring about [the patient’s] death’ 
is specifically prohibited as a ‘motivation’ on the part of the deci-
sion-makers in considering whether treatment is in the best interests 
of the patient (s 4 (5) Mental Capacity Act). Charles J pointed out 
that Lindsey Briggs’ case was based ‘on what Mr Briggs would have 
wanted, and that wish has been expressed in terms that he would 
have wanted to die’ (para 89).1 The very fact that it was expressed 
in this way was used by the counsel for the Clinical Commissioning 
Group and NHS Trust to argue that this precluded the court from 
making a decision in favour of treatment withdrawal. This was 
not an argument that the judge accepted. Instead he pointed out 
that the court (post-Aintree) was required to decide whether or not 
continued treatment was in PB’s best interests, and a decision that 
it was not would not be motivated by a desire to bring about PB’s 
death, notwithstanding the fact that PB—if he had had capacity—
might have been so motivated, as his wife claimed he would have 
been (para 94).1 One clear implication of the Briggs judgment, then, 
is that health professionals need not censure or recoil from family 
members who express the view that their relative ‘would rather be 
dead’. Rather this should be treated as an opportunity to involve 
families in best interests decision-making and to explore what the 
patient’s treatment wishes might have been.
self-determination
The term ‘self-determination’ (used on 15 occasions in the judg-
ment) refers simply to ‘what [Mr Briggs] would have wanted 
to do’ (para 7).1 Stated in more general terms, the term is used 
to mandate an enquiry into ‘what decision he or she would 
have made if they now had capacity and so, in exercise of their 
right of self-determination was able to make the decision’ (para 
69).1 ‘Self-determination’ is only one element of ‘best interests’ 
decision-making, but—following Briggs—a very important one: 
‘having his views and wishes taken into account and respected is 
a very significant aspect of P’s best interests’ (para 56).1
The judge’s focus was clearly on PB’s views and wishes as he 
would have expressed them when he had capacity and not on his 
current wishes regarding treatment (since none were ascertain-
able), nor on wishes that he might possibly develop in the future if 
continued treatment and rehabilitation were to lead to a higher level 
of consciousness (although still lacking capacity to actually make 
the decision himself). There is a substantial philosophical literature 
addressing the question of what weight to give to past (capacitous) 
wishes if current (non-capacitous) wishes conflict with them,12 13 
but this literature is not immediately relevant here since PB had no 
current discernible wishes or feelings (although it is possible that 
he may have developed some if treatment had been continued). 
Nevertheless it is worth noting that concerns about hypothetical 
future wishes are often integral to family and staff thinking on the 
ground in similar cases. Families sometimes hope that the person 
might recover sufficiently to express their own views, and hence 
relieve them of responsibility for contributing to treatment deci-
sions. Families also report having been told that they should be 
open to accepting a ‘new’ post brain injury person in place of the 
‘old’ person they knew before—and that profound brain injury may 
‘change the mind’ of the brain-injured person such that their past 
wishes have limited relevance, and the person might even be happy 
in a situation they had previously said would be intolerable to them 
(as it was claimed was likely to be the case for PB). Individuals take 
different perspectives on this issue,14 and families can be asked to 
consider what weight the patient (when capacitous) would have 
place on the wishes and feelings of a possible future non-capacitous 
self.
Since ‘self-determination’ for vegetative and minimally conscious 
patients depends crucially on ascertaining what patients’ views 
would have been when they had capacity, it is essential to elicit these 
in a timely fashion from those ‘engaged in caring for the person or 
interested in his welfare’ (s 4 (7)(b) Mental Capacity Act)—most 
likely the person’s family but also potentially (as in Briggs) the 
person’s friends and colleagues. Most families report that they have 
never been asked whether or not the patient would want continuing 
CANH treatment: the feeding tube is treated as a ‘given’, and rein-
serted and replaced without discussion, even when decisions have 
been taken to limit other potentially life-prolonging treatments.15 It 
takes tremendous courage for families to raise CANH withdrawal 
with staff.9 Those who do find ways of broaching the subject often 
feel that staff are sceptical about their ability to represent their rela-
tive’s wishes or suspect self-interested motives. It is true that the 
patient’s wishes are rarely immediately apparent, since few people 
provide specific instructions (equivalent to an advance decision) 
about what they would and would not want if they were in a disorder 
of consciousness, so relatives must extrapolate from things said and 
done in relation to similar but not identical circumstances (eg, in 
Briggs, PB’s support for his mother-in-law’s refusal of a feeding 
tube when she was dying with cancer). But the ‘holistic’ approach 
displayed in the Briggs judgment took as evidence not just what he 
said, but how he lived his life and embodied his values through the 
choices he made of, for example, employment, leisure pursuits and 
other displays of who and what mattered to him. Charles J points 
out that PB was ‘a committed and loving family man’ and that what 
he might want can reasonably be assumed to include ‘the interests 
of other people who P would have been likely to take into account’, 
that is, the interests of his wife and child (para 56).1 Health staff 
should feel reassured that when family members asserting that their 
relative would rather be dead say things like ‘he wouldn’t want to 
put us through this’, the reported concern of the patient for the 
well-being of his family can legitimately be part of the best interests 
decision-making process.
concLusion
best interests decision-making after briggs
According to Charles J, the decision that patients would have made 
regarding life-prolonging treatment when they had capacity should 
prevail over the presumption in favour of preserving their lives. 
This places a very strong requirement on those delivering treat-
ments to determine, as best they can, what the patient’s decision 
would have been. As should be obvious, the absence of a formal 
written advance decision cannot be used to claim that the patient 
has no ascertainable views, or (worse) that since the patient has not 
formally refused treatment consent can be presumed. Our broader 
research shows little evidence of much enquiry into patients’ wishes 
for the vast majority of those in prolonged disorders of conscious-
ness. Following Briggs such enquiry would require the following:
1. Developing a ‘holistic’ understanding of who the patient was 
before he lost capacity by listening to family and friends/
colleagues with the same compassion and attentiveness that 
Charles J displayed in Briggs (or employing an independent 
patient advocate to do so). The judge evaluated the evidence 
the family had presented by asking ‘whether the man 
described to me, and so a man with his beliefs and values 
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and approach to life would consent to his CANH treatment 
if he had heard the evidence and argument before me’ and 
detailed his understanding of PB as a Gulf War veteran and 
police officer, ‘a risk taker and a man of courage’ (para 120), 
and a committed family man. He engaged with the best 
interests decision as it relates to this particular person in this 
particular situation and considered what PB in particular 
would decide for himself if he were able so to do.
2. Giving the family as clear a sense as possible of the patient’s 
current condition and realistic ‘best case scenario’ in the 
future, if CANH is continued and any further rehabilitation 
provided. Families are rarely provided with this information 
at present: they have sometimes simply been told that 
‘anything is possible’ or ‘we just don’t know’, and some are 
still hoping, years later, for ‘miracle recoveries’ of the type 
regularly featured in the media. The person’s likely future 
needs to be explained in ordinary language and in specific 
detail (ie, not simply ‘very disabled’). In Briggs, the realistic 
‘best case scenario’ was established via a report agreed 
between the treating clinician and the expert rehabilitation 
consultant: PB would not regain mental capacity to make 
complex decisions (eg, about his own medical treatment, 
or even about whether to wear a jumper or a t-shirt based 
on an assessment of the weather), but he could be happy, 
make simple choices (eg, choose between a blue t-shirt 
and a red t-shirt) and would have some pleasurable—and 
some painful—experiences: he would be severely physically 
impaired needing 24-hour care and dependent on others for 
all activities of daily living (para 51).1 Recovery beyond this 
state was ‘not impossible only in the sense that one should 
never say never’ (para 47).1
3. Attending to family and friends’/colleagues’ views as to what 
the patient would have wanted, based on an understanding 
of his current state and ‘best case scenario’ future (and taking 
into account attitudes to risk and uncertainty). Elicitation 
of these views should avoid ‘pedantic’ and ‘unsympathetic’ 
cross-examination (para 97)1 and acknowledge that different 
family/friends may see things from slightly different 
perspectives. Despite differences between the way family 
members expressed themselves and the varying times at 
which they had arrived at their conclusion, the Briggs family 
was ‘convinced that if he was able to express it his view 
would be ‘enough is enough’ because … for him this [i.e. 
even the best case scenario] was not a life that was worth 
living’ (para 112).1 Family members also pointed out that 
‘Mr Briggs would factor in the point that the hoped for 
improvement to the best case scenario is only a possibility’ 
(para 116).1
In conclusion, the Briggs case is significant because of its role 
in case law as a precedent for future decision-making by the 
courts and because the arguments used in court address core 
ethical issues in everyday thinking on the part of those who care 
for and about these patients. This makes it very different from 
some judgments concerning these patients that have focused 
more narrowly on the patients’ precise diagnosis as a prerequi-
site for decision-making—often not of primary concern to the 
family, who believe that the patient would not want to be kept 
alive in either a vegetative or a minimally conscious state.14 The 
Briggs judgment, and the reasoning behind it, should change 
the texture and quality of best interests decision-making about 
these patients ‘on the ground’. It does this by showing in the 
clearest possible way that the patient’s prior wishes, feelings, 
values and beliefs carry a great deal of weight in best inter-
ests decision-making, and by offering a model for how such 
patient-centred decision-making can be implemented. Neither 
sanctity of life nor uncertainty of diagnosis/prognosis is an auto-
matic trump card dictating life-prolonging treatment. Rather, 
the individual person and what they would have decided when 
they had capacity must be at the centre of all decisions made 
about them.
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